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
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
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# FINAL REPORT

## PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR IV

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

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# PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR



HOSTED BY  
MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT E. WOLFF

COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN COMMAND  
FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII 96858

SEMINAR CHAIRMAN  
COLONEL NOLAN M. SIGLER  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS  
UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

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PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

COUNTRIES REPRESENTED

Australia

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Japan\*

Korea

Malaysia

New Zealand

Papua New Guinea

Philippines

Singapore

Thailand

Tonga

United States

\*OBSERVERS

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR

ATTENDEES

AUSTRALIA

COL J.P.A. DEIGHTON, Commandant of the Infantry Center, Australian Army

BANGLADESH

MG MOIN UL Hussain Chowdhury, Adjutant General, Bangladesh Army.

COL Mohammad Azizur RAHMAN, General Staff, Bangladesh Army

BURMA

COL Charles A. SCHUH, USA, US Defense Attache, Rangoon, Burma

INDONESIA

COL ADAM Saleh, Director of Intelligence Planning, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Security, HQ Indonesia Army

COL Aswin S. SIAGIAN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, Army Strategic Command

COL HARSONO Natawardaja, Chief, Basic Military Science and Training Department, Army Military Academy

LTC John B. HASEMAN, USA, Chief, Army Division, US Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia

JAPAN

LTC Noriaki HIRASAKI, Education and Training Dept., Ground Staff Office, Japan  
Ground Self Defense Force  
(Observer)

LTC Kiyoshi ICHIKAWA, Plans and Operations Dept., Ground Staff Office, Japan  
Ground Self Defense Force  
(Observer)

LTC William E. CATES, USA, Mutual Defense Office-Japan

LTC Kazuo KOIKE, USA, Chief, JGSDF Affairs Division, Ofc of the ACoS, G3, USARJ

#### KOREA

COL NAM Hyung Wook, Chief, Outside Army Education/Training, DCS Operations and Training, Hdqtrs, Republic of Korea Army

LTC KIM Moo Woong, Chief of Special Warfare Dept., Army College, Republic of Korea Army

LTC KIM Choon Nam, Chairman, Social Science Dept., Korean Military Academy

MG Orlando E. GONZALES, USA, Chief, JUSMAG Korea

LTC Joe S. FALKNER, USA, Army Division, JUSMAG Korea

#### MALAYSIA

COL Mohd KALAM Azad Bin Mohd Taib, Deputy Commander, Malaysian Staff College

COL Franklin W. COLLINS, USA, Defense Attache, US Embassy, Kuala Lumpur

#### NEW ZEALAND

MG Brian M. POANANGA, Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand Army

LTC David W. S. MOLONEY, Director of Infantry and Special Air Services, New Zealand Army

LTC Anthony L. BIRKS, Deputy Regional Commander, 3 TFR, New Zealand Army

#### PAPUA NEW GUINEA

COL A. R. Tony HUAI, Chief of Operations, Papua New Guinea Defense Force

LTC Paul SOMA, Director of Personnel Services, Papua New Guinea Defense Force

#### PHILIPPINES

COL Edgardo A. ALFABETO, ACofS, C-3 (Operations), Philippine Constabulary and Acting Director for Ops, Tng, and Org, Integrated National Police (INP)

COL Felix A. BRAWNER, Jr., ACofS, G-3 (Operations), Philippine Army

COL Daniel B. LABRADO, Executive Officer, C-2 (Intelligence) Division, Headquarters Philippine Constabulary



COL Eugenio A. OCAMPO, Jr., Secretary Constabulary Staff and Acting Secretary to the Directorial Staff, Integrated National Police (INP)

COL Cirilo O. OROPESA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-7 (Home Defense), Philippine Army

COL Richard D. HOOKER, USA, Army Attache, US Embassy, Manila

LTC Herbert G. THOMS, USA, Army Section, Chief, Ground Forces Service Section, JUSMAG Philippines.

#### SINGAPORE

LTC NG Jui Ping, Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Personnel (G-1), Singapore Armed Forces (SAF)

MAJ LIM Hng Kiang, Head, Potential Plans Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of the General Staff for Plans (G-5), SAF

Mr. TAN Peng Yam, Research Officer, Ministry of National Defence

COL John M. FITZGERALD II, USA, Army Attache, U.S. Embassy, Singapore

#### THAILAND

COL SONGSERM Whaisoka, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations (G-3), 4th Army Area, Royal Thai Army (RTA)

LTC CHARN Boonprasert, Section Chief, Training and Education Division, Director of Operations (G-3), RTA

LTC SOMBATI Prasobnetr, Chief Operations Section, Operations Division, Director of Operations (G-3), RTA

LTC Charles SHAW, USA, Executive Officer and Chief, Joint Services Division, JUSMAGTHAI

#### TONGA

HRH CROWN PRINCE TUPOUTO'A, Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence (Observer)

Mr. Tu'a TAUMOEPEAU, Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Defence (Observer)

LT Paula MATOTO, Tonga Defence Services

2LT Mailefihi TUKU'AHU, Tonga Defence Services

#### UNITED STATES

GEN John W. VESSEY, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D.C.

GEN Donn A. STARRY, Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command,  
Ft Monroe, VA

MG Howard F. STONE, Commander, 9th Infantry Division, Ft Lewis, WA

COL Arthur E. LYKKE, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

COL Ronald A. SHACKELTON, Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management,  
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH

COL Robert WAGG, International Rationalization Office, ODCSOPS, DA, Washington, DC

LTC Richard D. BELTSON, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Ft Leavenworth, KS

LTC Norman L. CUSTARD, Assistant Director, Security Assistance Training Management  
Office (SATMO), Ft Bragg, NC

LTC Gary A. DE BAUCHE, School of International Studies, U.S. Army Institute  
of Military Assistance (USAIMA), Ft Bragg, NC

LTC Thomas J. GODFREY, Pacific Branch, Regional Operations, Office of the Deputy  
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQ Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C.

LTC John B. ZIMMERMAN, United States Army Materiel Development and Readiness  
Command, Alexandria, VA

MAJ Frederick A. DREW, Chief, Ops Div, OACS G-3, 7th Inf Div, Ft Ord, CA

MAJ (Ret.) Stanley HYROWSKI, Social Scientist, Directorate of Combat and Doctrine  
Development, USAIMA, Ft Bragg, NC

MAJ David JONES, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 9th Infantry  
Division, Ft Lewis, WA

MAJ James G. MEIKLE, Intelligence Officer, Office of the Assistant Chief of  
Staff for Intelligence, HQ Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.

#### US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

MG Herbert E. WOLFF, Commander

BG Richard G. CARDILLO, Deputy Commander

COL Charles C. SPEROW, Deputy Chief of Staff

COL Nolan M. SIGLER, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans  
COL Howard K. OKITA, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel  
COL John R. MEESE, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
COL John D. MILLER, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics  
COL Robert H. BOTTS, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications-Electronics  
COL Emory W. BUSH, Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs  
COL Adolph A. HIGHT, Engineer  
COL David G. RHOADS, Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation Management  
LTC Thomas G. THOMPSON, Chief, Strategy, Plans, International Relations,  
Security Assistance (SPIRSA) Division, ODCSOPS  
LTC Karl P. PIOTROWSKI, Southeast Asia Area Officer, SPIRSA, ODCSOPS  
LTC Ronald D. TURNER, Chief, International Military Affairs Branch, SPIRSA,  
ODCSOPS  
LTC Robert K. TYSON, Plans Officer, Plans Branch, ODCSOPS  
MAJ Sterling R. RICHARDSON, Northeast Asia Officer, SPIRSA, ODCSOPS  
MAJ Lawrence H. TIFVERMAN, Southeast/South Asia Area Officer, SPIRSA, ODCSOPS

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

MG Alexander M. WEYAND, Commander  
BG Eugene S. KORPAL, Assistant Division Commander  
MAJ Francis M. PITARO, Asst Maintenance Management Officer, DISCOM  
CPT Douglas BROWN, Tgt Analyst, Fire Support Element

US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, HAWAII (USASCH)

COL Charles G. SCOTT, Commander

IX CORPS (AUG)

COL James D. C. CHANG, Deputy Commander  
COL Moss M. IKEDA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

AGENDA

Pacific Armies Management Seminar IV  
3-7 November 1980  
Honolulu, Hawaii

AGENDA

Monday, 3 Nov 80

0800-0900	Registration
0900-0915	Call to Order, Welcoming Remarks by MG Herbert E. Wolff, Commander, US Army Western Command
0915-0945	Keynote Speaker, GEN Donn A. Starry, Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
0945-1015	Official Photograph
1015-1200	Special Report: "Division 86," TRADOC and DARCOM
1200-1330	PAMS IV Executive Luncheon hosted by MG Wolff
1200-1330	Lunch
1330-1415	Presentation: "9th Infantry Division Test Bed Program," 9th Infantry Division
1415-1430	Refreshment Break
1430-1500	Panel Organization Meetings
1830-2030	Commanders Reception at the Cannon Club, Ft. Ruger

Tuesday, 4 Nov 80

0855-0900	Call to Order, Administrative Announcements
0900-0945	Presentation: "Introduction to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)," US Army Institute of Military Assistance (USAIMA)
0945-1030	Presentation: "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," Philippines
1030-1045	Refreshment Break
1045-1130	Presentation: "Internal Defense of a Nation," Thailand

Tuesday, 4 Nov 80 continued

1130-1230	Lunch
1230-1315	Presentation: "Internal Defense and Development: Intelligence Cooperation," Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, U.S. Army
1315-1400	Presentation: "Management and the Role of the Army in Internal Defense and Development," Indonesia
1400-1415	Refreshment Break
1415-1530	Panel Discussions: "Internal Defense and Development: The Environment"
1530-1630	Planning Committee Meeting
1545-1830	Optional Trip to Pearl Harbor Navy Exchange.

Wednesday, 5 Nov 80

0855-0900	Call to Order, Administrative Announcements
0900-0945	Panel Reports: "Internal Defense and Development: The Environment"
0945-1030	Presentation: "Counterinfiltration Training and Coastal Security Planning," Korea
1030-1045	Refreshment Break
1045-1115	Featured Speaker: General John W. Vessey, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, U.S. Army
1115-1130	Question and Answer Period
1130-1230	Planning Committee Luncheon, hosted by COL Meese
1130-1230	Lunch
1230-1315	Presentation: "The Development of Internal Defense," Singapore
1315-1400	Presentation: "Internal Defense and Development: Doctrine and Concepts," USAIMA, U.S. Army
1400-1415	Refreshment Break
1415-1500	Presentation: "Complementarity and Interoperability," Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army

Wednesday, 5 Nov 80 continued

1500-1600 Panel Discussions: "Internal Defense and Development:  
Government Prescriptions and Remedies"

1830-2130 Optional Dinner and Tama's Hula Nani Show, Hale Koa Hotel

Thursday, 6 Nov 80

0855-0900 Call to Order, Administrative Announcements

0900-0945 Panel Reports: "Internal Defense and Development: The Government  
Prescription"

0945-1030 Presentation: "The Vanuatu Operation," Papua New Guinea

1030-1045 Refreshment Break

1045-1115 Presentation: "Automatic Data Processing in Support of Internal  
Defense and Development," US Army Western Command

1115-1300 Demonstration: 25th Infantry Division Data Center, Ft. DeRussy:  
Panel 1: 1125-1145  
Panel 2: 1200-1220  
Panel 3: 1230-1250

1115-1300 Lunch

1300-1345 Presentation: "The Military as a Modernizing Force," USAIMA

1345-1430 Presentation: "Malaysian Insurgency Experience," Malaysia

1430-1530 Panel Discussions: "Limits of a Nation's Power"

1530-1600 Steering Committee Meeting

Friday, 7 Nov 80

0855-0900 Call to Order, Administrative Announcements.

0900-0945 Panel Reports: "Limits of a Nation's Power"

0945-1015 Chairman's Time

1015-1030 Refreshment Break

1030-1115 Presentation: "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia,"  
New Zealand

Friday, 7 Nov 80 continued

1115-1145	Featured Speaker: MG Brian M. Poananga, Chief of the General Staff, New Zealand Army
1145-1200	Question and Answer Period
1200-1330	Steering Committee Luncheon, hosted by COL Sigler
1200-1330	Lunch
1330-1500	Closing Remarks by Country Senior Representatives
1800-1900	Cocktail Hour, DeRussy Room, Hale Koa Hotel
1900-2100	PAMS Dinner and Program, DeRussy Room, Hale Koa Hotel. Speaker: MG Herbert E. Wolff, Commander, US Army Western Command



PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The fourth Pacific Armies Management Seminar hosted by US Army Western Command met in Honolulu 3-7 November 1980. The seminar theme was Internal Defense and Development, emphasizing techniques used by attending nations to contend with insurgencies and lessons derived from those experiences. Efforts were directed at developing methods to achieve commonality and interoperability among participating nations to allow them to assist each other in countering insurgencies and, as necessary, conducting coalition warfare in the Pacific region. Participants from Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, United States, as well as observers from Japan attended. As has been the custom at previous PAMS, delegates made presentations, met in smaller panel discussion groups, and reported the results of their panel discussions at the plenary sessions.

Major General Herbert E. Wolff, Commander of US Army Western Command and the official host, opened PAMS IV with welcoming remarks and introduced the country delegations and the keynote speaker, General Donn A. Starry, Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft Monroe, Virginia. In his keynote address, General Starry focused on the experiences of the United States in Vietnam and how attendees must learn from the successes and failures of both the French and the Americans in that war. General Starry outlined the problems he had encountered as a commander of armored cavalry forces, discussing the misuse of mounted formations and the countermeasures employed by the Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars against his regiment. A copy of General Starry's remarks is included in the PAMS IV Final Report.

The remainder of the first day was devoted to special reports on the progress of the Army 86 program and the 9th Infantry Division "Test Bed" project. Representatives from the Combined Arms Center at Ft Leavenworth, Kansas and from the Army Materiel and Readiness Command in Alexandria, Virginia briefed on the former and Major General Howard F. Stone, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division, discussed the latter. They collectively outlined the future organizational structure of the US Army's heavy and light divisions, the new weapons systems and associated equipment that will enhance organizational effectiveness, and how some currently available weapons and equipment are being used to upgrade the lethality and strategic mobility of the 9th Infantry Division. The highlight of the first day for the senior delegates from each nation was the participation of Admiral Robert Long, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command, in an executive luncheon. During the luncheon, Admiral Long informally discussed his view of the strategic imperatives of and the potential for conflict in the Asia-Pacific area.

The second day was devoted to the theme "Internal Defense and Development: the Environment." The day began with a presentation by a representative of the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance which outlined, on a conceptual level, environments in which insurgencies may flourish. The remainder of the morning was dedicated to presentations on two existing environments for insurgency by representatives from Thailand and the Philippines, who discussed insurgent movements in their respective nations. The

afternoon session began with a presentation by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, on intelligence operations in support of internal defense and development and ended with an Indonesian presentation on the management of and the role of the Indonesian Army in the internal defense and internal development of Indonesia. The second day closed with panel discussions concerning the environment that allows the formation of an insurgency; insurgent organizations and goals; organizing the government and military to counter insurgencies; the role of terrorism; the value of public support; and population and resource control in an insurgency environment. For complete details, see panel reports.

On the third day the delegates addressed governmental prescriptions and remedies to combat insurgencies. The representatives of the Republic of Korea highlighted their approach to counterinfiltration training and coastal security planning to combat the surreptitious insertion of North Korean agents and commandos into South Korea. Representatives of the United States Army Institute for Military Assistance outlined doctrines and concepts of internal defense and development around which one might devise a workable program to counter insurgency movements. Singapore described its experiences with anti-governmental agitation and how economic and social progress eliminated the root causes for agitation thereby negating the need for a large military effort to counter the insurgents. A representative of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the U.S. Army presented some approaches to establishing interoperability and commonality among nations for the purpose of pursuing regional solutions to the insurgent problem. The featured speaker on this day was General John W. Vessey, Jr., Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. General Vessey spoke in broad terms of the economic and strategic importance of the Pacific region to the United States. He reinforced the importance of PAMS in serving the security interest of all participating countries and described the theme of internal defense and development as timely and important. Stability within nations, he contended, lends to stability among nations. General Vessey's remarks are included in the PAMS IV Final Report. Panel discussions on the third day involved counterinsurgency operations; organization and training for these operations; and peripheral activities applicable to internal defense such as methods to counter terrorism, command and control techniques as well as psychological operations. For complete details, see panel reports.

The fourth day was set aside for completion of discussions concerning governmental remedies and introduction of the topic of the limits of a nation's power to counter insurgent movements. The first presentation was a definitive description of the Vanuatu operation by a representative of the delegation from Papua New Guinea. It highlighted the small unit approach to dealing with insurgents and provided insights into the political complexities of this recently completed, successful operation. The delegate from Malaysia discussed his nation's experience with an insurgency movement and how ANZUK and Malaysian military forces cooperated to combat it. He further described Malaysia's progressive, politico-economic efforts to preclude resurrection of an insurgent movement. Representatives from the United States presented a doctrinal approach

to using military elements as modernizing, nation-building forces and discussed the use of simple computer systems to manage an internal defense effort. The final panel discussions of PAMS IV occurred this day and addressed determination of force structure, commonality of equipment, domestic assistance, the role of reserves, as well as training and exercises necessary to pursue a successful internal defense effort. For complete details, see panel reports.

The final seminar day was devoted to panel reports and featured presentations by Major General Brian M. Poananga, Chief of the General Staff of the New Zealand Army and by a New Zealand delegate, who discussed his nation's participation in the Commonwealth Peace Keeping Force in Rhodesia. Major General Poananga presented his views on revolutionary war and the inextricable linkage between the legitimacy of a government and the emergence of insurgencies. He further endorsed the PAMS approach to military cooperation in the Pacific region and complimented the participants on their professional approach to addressing the subject at hand. Major General Poananga's remarks are also included in the final report.

In their closing remarks, the senior representatives, as they have in the past, cited the value of the Pacific Army Management Seminar series. There was unanimity that the PAMS process fulfills an urgent need in the Pacific region and that gathering for the exchange of ideas benefits all.

The PAMS V Planning Committee recommended, and the Steering Committee concurred, that for PAMS V, Manila be designated the primary site, Seoul the alternate site and Honolulu the final contingency site if convocation at either the primary or alternate site became impossible and that, in either locale, the seminar be co-hosted by WESTCOM if agreeable to the selected host Army. A number of late 1981 dates were discussed for PAMS V with WESTCOM expressing a preference for a pre-October 1981 convocation. Since key delegates had not been empowered to make a formal proposal, it was concluded that a definitive date would be decided after the delegates had consulted with superiors following their return from PAMS IV. The specific location and dates will be established by June 1981, after coordination by the PAMS Secretariat and will be passed to all Asia-Pacific Army representatives. The overall theme for PAMS V is "Training Management" and will address both active and reserve training under the three broad headings: policy, concepts, and doctrine; plans and programs; and methods and techniques. For complete details, see the Steering/Planning Committee Report.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

. There is a worldwide trend of increased use of urban terrorist tactics by insurgent groups. This type of tactic is extremely difficult to counter. Socio-political measures are more effective in suppressing urban terrorism than the use of military force.

. Broad base paramilitary, internal defense organizations formed from volunteer civilians who are given limited police powers are an effective means to counter insurgent efforts.

. Direct military force should be used to deal with internal threats only after other, less violent counter measures have clearly failed. Police force should be used first and regular military units committed only if the police prove ineffective.

. Counterinsurgent organizations, tactics, and training should be flexible and tailored to the local situation.

. Paramilitary organizations should have a dual, social and military, role. These organizations provide a valuable two-way channel of communications for the government to explain its policies and for the people to vent their grievances.

. The national leadership should carefully define the military versus para military role in internal defense. Political leaders should set the priorities and determine what portion of military effort will be spent in preparing for or engaging in internal defense operations. The primary role of conventional regular military forces should be external defense.

. The relative degree of specialized unconventional training giving regular military forces is determined by the nature and intensity of the internal threat as well as the amount of time available to prepare to counter the threat. The amount of conventional military involvement in internal defense missions is determined by factors such as historical development of the nation, resources available, and existing socio-political conditions.

. Careful threat analysis and good intelligence are keys to organizing for and effectively countering insurgencies. Because insurgents normally have the initiative and element of surprise to aid them, the government response must be rapid and flexible. Specially trained and equipped units enhance the government's capability to effectively deal with an insurgency.

. Counter insurgency training is expensive in terms of time, money, and special equipment required; however, all operational personnel should receive specialized training.

. Commonalty of doctrine and equipment is a desirable goal from a strictly military viewpoint, but economic and political factors often preclude totally achieving this goal.

. Participation in multi-national joint/combined exercises is the best method to enhance interoperability and achieve commonalty of doctrine. Exchanges of personnel and doctrinal publications is another method to enhance interoperability and also promotes understanding and friendship.

. Insurgent strategy will be dictated by many factors, and identifying the insurgent strategy will assist in determining the appropriate solutions.

. Caution must be exercised when determining strategies to avoid stereotyping the insurgent which might cloud the evaluation of the insurgents' actions, thereby lessening the effectiveness of the response to the actions.

. Flexibility must be maintained in order to respond to changes in insurgent strategies.

. There must be a well planned resource allocation program. The conflicting demands between developmental programs and military programs must be closely monitored to optimize results.

. Lack of action by the government on a particular program must be explained to the people along with an outline of a program to address the problem in the future.

. The government must develop a realistic goal for countering an insurgency. Total destruction would be the ideal whereas the rendering of the insurgency to a manageable level may be a more realistic substitute.

. It is important not only to solve a problem but also to inform the populace that the problem has been resolved. The effective use of the media to inform of positive accomplishments of the existing regime will assist in developing support for the government.

. Each IDAD situation will dictate what methods are best used to solve the problems. There is no all encompassing national prescription for IDAD operations.

. Effective psychological operations must be integrated with and thereby support any IDAD program.

. It is important that nations be prepared to conduct combined operations with neighboring countries whose territories may be used as sanctuaries by insurgent movements.

. Armed forces, when trying to counter insurgencies, must be equally sensitive to the political and economic goals of the populace as well as the requirement to provide basic security needs.

. There is a need for a centralized intelligence system consisting of all military and civilian intelligence organizations structured to allow a continuous flow of information from the source into a national level intelligence center.

. Intelligence collection in the IDAD environment will differ from the conventional situation and requirements will only be satisfied by reporting all information in minute detail and carefully analyzing all data to assess insurgent capabilities and plans.

. Security and nation building or internal development are interdependent and must be totally integrated and coordinated. Failure to achieve unity of effort will lead to counter productive programs.

. Civil and military security forces must be integrated at every level.

. Civic action programs are important to bring the benefits of government to rural areas, to provide civilian skill training to mobilized military personnel and to stimulate a favorable relationship between the populace and military security forces.

. The populace must become involved in development programs by participating in civil, self-help projects.

. In developing nations the military has a unique capability to function as a strong force for modernization but the military must reflect and be identified with the people they serve.

. Insurgent terrorism has four major, politically interrelated aims: notoriety for the group and its causes; destabilization of the state, primarily by assassinations, demoralization of the populace through fear, and the augmentation of insurgent force morale.

. Terrorist acts fall into two broad categories: selective acts, such as assassinations, kidnappings and destruction of selected targets; and non-selective acts such as random bombings and shooting and arson.

. Terrorist acts elicit correlative governmental responses. Rapid reestablishment of domestic tranquility and restoration of faith in the state requires deliberate military, civilian, and media cooperation. If tactics change, innovative responses must be planned to counter them.

. Reserve forces are most beneficial and cost-effective when their missions of defense, augmentation, reinforcement, disaster relief and civic action are integrated with regular forces at the national level.

. Problems encountered by reserve forces are similar to those encountered by any armed force, and can best be handled as part of an integrated regular-reserve forces solution.



. Employment of reserve combat and combat support elements is best managed at the area level. Control of specialized units and individual mobilization is most effective when centralized as part of a national plan. .

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

OPENING REMARKS

MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT E. WOLFF  
COMMANDER, US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

## OPENING REMARKS

Good morning, aloha and welcome to the Fourth Pacific Armies Management Seminar. I am extremely pleased with the excellent turnout. Several of you are familiar from previous PAMS; I am looking forward to renewing acquaintances with you during this upcoming week. To those of you attending for the first time, an especially warm welcome and my best wishes for a successfully productive and enjoyable week in Hawaii.

I realize that many of you have traveled great distances and some may be here in these beautiful islands for the first time. The information packet was prepared with this in mind and will answer many of your routine questions. I will also call your attention to the welcome desk set up outside this room. The people at the desk have the mission of assisting you in any way that they can. With your help, my staff and I are confident that we can make the next few days a memorable experience for you. If you need any assistance, just let us know.

For those of you who are with us for the first time, let me review some of the reasons for initiating the Pacific Armies Management Seminar series and why we attach importance to it. Traditionally, opportunities to meet and discuss professional military subjects have led to greater understanding and rapport among soldiers. However, in the period immediately preceding initiation of the PAMS series, opportunities for army-to-army contacts between the U.S. Army and many other armies of the Asia-Pacific region had declined appreciably and were limited except in Korea and Japan. Against this background, we felt it was imperative that we take steps to reverse the trend, we developed a program to expand army-to-army contacts through increased staff visits, exchanges, and stopovers in Hawaii for personnel returning from US training, and proposed to host a series of professional military seminars called the Pacific Armies Management Seminar.

Some of you were here for our very first PAMS session. We discussed training management. We sought to identify and to share techniques to improve training realism and operational readiness in our respective armies. We addressed common problems, and we were successful in identifying solutions to many of these problems.

For our second seminar, "Management of Resources" was our topic, and we identified, as well as shared, management techniques used by participating armies to maximize results from constrained and declining resources. We agreed that time was one of our most precious commodities. We branched out to discuss national strategy and its impact on resources. We agreed that trade-offs occur, of necessity, between near-term readiness and long-term modernization.

In PAMS III, our theme was "Operational Planning and Management." During that seminar we correlated the lessons of the first two PAMS by discussing how we employ given resources, where the training emphasis should lie, and what operational capabilities we expect to achieve. We discovered that resource management and training are directly related to operational readiness and impact greatly on the plans we prepare to implement national policy. It became apparent that in the management process, planning is necessarily shaped by the realities of resources, training, management, and operational capabilities.

This week our theme is Internal Defense and Development, a theme which can be used as a meaningfully realistic case study around which we can apply lessons learned and techniques developed in our first three seminars. It will also allow us to identify areas where we, as members of the military community in the Pacific region can, through mutual support and standardization of procedures, complement one another as we seek common goals and objectives.

We are indebted to the attendees at previous PAMS who have made the PAMS series a success. They have contributed their talents, freely shared their expertise, and built a firm foundation for us today. We have important work to do and high standards to match. I am confident that you will be equal to the challenge and that you will make this session even more successful.

At this time, I would like to introduce the Asia-Pacific delegations we have at this Fourth Pacific Armies Management Seminar. As I call your name, I ask that you stand so that we may recognize you. I'd like to point out that eight of the nations here today were among our original PAMS attendees and have attended all of our PAMS sessions. They deserve our special thanks and appreciation.

And now, it gives me particular pleasure to introduce our next speaker. Our guest was the keynote speaker in our very first PAMS in 1978. When you read his biography, I am certain you concluded that this great American soldier who enlisted in the United States Army in 1943 is a man of success and achievement. His graduation from West Point Military Academy was followed by a series of command assignments through corps level in Germany and highlighted by combat leadership in Vietnam and Cambodia.

He is a decorated and highly educated manager and leader. As judged by military experts in Israel and throughout NATO, he is Mr. Armor and Tank Warfare of the western world. We know that he is the commander of the largest school and training system in the free world and we hope that he commands the very best in the entire world.

The book which governs the lives of most Christians and Jews, "the Bible," tells us that God, the Creator, had a major problem on the third day of creation. He conceived of darkness to distinguish night from day only to discover a major inadequacy. By blanketing the world in darkness, people could not find their way; they could not navigate; they could not chart a course to head in the right direction; so in order to give direction where there might have been chaos, in order to provide a way to reach destination, he simply said: "Let it be Starry."

Naturally, I won't suggest that the Chief of Staff of the Army is God Almighty, though some soldiers might think so, but it appears that we follow the good book. On several occasions in the past when our Army needed a change of direction, needed to chart a new course or simply looked for navigation in the right direction, the word went out, "Let it be Starry."

When the central battle in Europe needed definition, identification, and a road map on how to win the first battle, the word went out, "Let it be Starry." When we initiated the PAMS series and looked for a keynote speaker, the answer was, "Let it be Starry," and now that we have assembled the greatest number of Pacific region participants, it is appropriate again that "It be Starry." Help me to give an aloha welcome to a respected friend, a great soldier with worldwide professional reputation, General Donn Starry.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

GENERAL DONN A. STARRY

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

General Donn A. Starry

General Wolff, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

The fact that many in this room traveled over 6,000 miles to come to this seminar emphasizes the importance of the subjects to be discussed in the next few days.

Among nations who are friends, exchanging ideas is essential to friendship and the key to successful cooperation in war should war come. Thus this seminar on "Insurgency" is an opportunity for us to strengthen friendships and learn from each other.

Part of the learning process must begin by reviewing the lessons of past insurgency operations. What problems were they, how were they dealt with, can we apply any of these lessons to making our armies better prepared for any future insurgent-type conflict? I think we can if only we'll have the courage and honesty to review our past activities without being inhibited by bias and prejudice.

Had our Army taken the same approach toward the lessons and experiences gained by the French during their long years of involvement in the Indochina war, some of the decisions would have been made differently right from the start.

It is a fact that French after-action reports were candid, comprehensive, sometimes blunt. In the United States, because of restrictive military security regulations and a general lack of interest in the French operations, there was no body of military knowledge of Vietnam.

What was known had not been drawn from after-action reports but from books written by civilians. Foremost among these was Bernard B. Fall's "Street without Joy" which greatly influenced the American military attitude toward armored operations in Vietnam.

Typical of the misinformation which was drawn from such books was that which related to a 6-month period in the final struggles of a French Mobile Striking Force, Groupement Mobile 100. The vivid and terrifying story of this group's final days seemed to many to describe the fate in store for any armored unit that tried to fight insurgents in the jungles.

Actually, Groupement Mobile 100 was not an armored unit at all, but an infantry task force of 2,600 men, organized into four truck-mounted infantry battalions, reinforced with one artillery battalion and ten light tanks. Restricted to movement on roads, deploying to fight on foot, the Mobile Group was extremely vulnerable to ambush, and, indeed, a series of ambushes finally destroyed it.

Because most people did not take the time to understand the organization and actions of Groupement Mobile 100, its fate cast a pall over armored operations in Vietnam for almost 12 years. The story of this disaster became a major source for unfavorable references to French armored operations in Vietnam, and contributed much to the growing myths of the impossibility of conducting mounted combat in that environment. In fact, the myth was so widely accepted that it tended to overshadow French successes as well as some armored exploits of the Vietnamese Army, and it actually delayed the development of Vietnamese armored forces. Unfortunately, US commanders were to repeat many of the mistakes of the French when American armored units were employed.

It is for this reason that the theme of this seminar is so germane. We must never again allow ourselves to be blind to the experiences of earlier insurgency operations, regardless of which countries were involved. There is too much that can be learned from such operations and the price paid in human lives is too premium not to capitalize on any and all sources of experiences.

It is for this reason also that today I have chosen to highlight some of the most telling lessons learned from our experience in Southeast Asia. Since my background in that war was predominantly in armored operations, I'll focus my comments in that area. It must be recognized at the outset, however, that the term armored units, as I will use it, is generic and includes tank and mechanized infantry battalions and companies, armored cavalry squadrons and troops, and air cavalry squadrons and troops--all forces whose primary *modus operandi* was to fight mounted.

It is always difficult to select from a list of lessons to be inferred from the experiences of any war. It is even more difficult, perhaps presumptive, to extrapolate the lessons of one war, and, invoking some rule of universality, correctly claim their relevance to another war--especially to one in the future. But try we must because it is obvious that we do not readily learn from our own mistakes, and that we learn even less from the mistakes of others.

The first of those lessons has to do with the piecemeal use of armored forces. In spite of knowing the penchant of the French for piecemeal use of armored units and how that practice worked to their disadvantage in Vietnam, we did it ourselves. In spite of the caution against piecemeal use of armored units which had been an important part of US military doctrine since World War II, many American combat leaders, both young and old, never heeded it. We went on to make the same mistakes again in Vietnam, with air cavalry, ground cavalry, mechanized infantry, tank battalions, and other units. We simply had not learned our lessons very well.

In Vietnam the cost to US forces of committing armor piecemeal was not noticeably high, but on another battlefield, against another enemy--one that could capitalize on the mistake by destroying any fragmented force--the mistake could be fatal.

Was it recognition that the enemy in Vietnam was unlikely to be able to destroy the fragmented forces that persuaded senior US commanders to split their armored units? Or was it a serious mistake reflecting the failure of the military to learn from the past? Armor soldiers would argue for the latter--that it was mistake, a typical and frequently repeated mistake in any war which is generally viewed by senior commanders as an infantry war. It was made in Korea; it was made in Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, advice based on a considerable body of experience was available from American officers who had served as advisors to South Vietnamese armored units early in the war. For a number of reasons this advice either was not offered to the right people or was not heeded by senior officers able to influence policy and tactics in the employment of armor. We cannot afford to make this mistake again.

A second lesson of Vietnam worthy of mention today has to do with finding the enemy. Closely related to it is possibly the most exciting development of the Vietnam era: the fielding of air cavalry.

Although the problem exists in most all wars, in an insurgency war the need to find the enemy before he can assemble and organize his forces is critical. Especially important in a future war will be an early knowledge of where the enemy has massed those weapons that will be vital to success in the battle. The special mobility of air cavalry provides a badly needed means of reconnaissance and surveillance.

In the later stages of the war in Vietnam, when air cavalry was confronted with sophisticated enemy air defenses, it became apparent that the reconnaissance mission could still be performed if commanders were willing to pay the price of knocking out enemy air defenses. If information on the enemy is necessary, then the price must be paid.

Our Army correctly concluded we could not dispense with air cavalry on the theory that it can only survive against an enemy possessing little or no air defense. The reconnaissance mission is too critical. We have made considerable strides in both equipment and tactics to enable air cavalry units to perform in the high intensity air defense environment. Air cavalry adds a new dimension to reconnaissance, one complementary to reconnaissance by ground units and therefore it is imperative that we capitalize on its capabilities.

That armored cavalry units in Vietnam were widely used as combat maneuver forces should not be allowed to obscure the fact that they are still part of the central core of the reconnaissance team. The air cavalry-ground combination can give a much needed advantage to the force commander who uses it wisely.

The employment of integrated air and ground cavalry must be fully developed and expanded if we are to realize the full potential of the reconnaissance team.



Third among the lessons of Vietnam is what can be done in area and route security; especially in that area traditionally considered the rear. In an insurgency environment, of course, there really is no rear area; the enemy can be all around. Such a situation could also be encountered in a fast-moving more conventional war. In the past, the US Army frequently used armored cavalry and other armored units for rear area security missions, especially in Vietnam. While for many reasons armored units are good at this work, the practice can be, and indeed was in Vietnam, a considerable drain on combat forces capable of accomplishing much more for their commander than clearing roads and protecting logistical units.

In a situation where the availability of combat forces is limited to begin with, it would seem far better to equip and train logistical units to protect themselves. Rear area security could also be provided by military police or other units mounted in armored cars. From the standpoint of returns for manpower and equipment invested, it is far more cost-effective to use units such as these rather than assigning a tank, a mechanized infantry, an armored cavalry unit the same task. The concept of furnishing protection for rear areas and resupply routes either with units stationed in the area and/or by a military police type unit equipped for this purpose needs full exploration and development.

Associated with the rear area security issue is that of logistical support for mobile units. The Vietnam insurgency experience has provided many useful, and sometimes bitter, lessons in maintenance, resupply and battlefield recovery.

Maintenance units tended to operate well to the rear. Considerable pressure was required in many cases to persuade them they could and should operate teams as far forward as squadron or battalion; making repairs on site at company, troop, or battery level. The alternative was a long haul of damaged equipment back to a maintenance camp and a long return haul of repaired equipment back to the unit--a very expensive procedure. When such a situation exists, a reexamination of traditional direct and general support relationships is mandatory. A way must be found to provide better security for rear area support units and the routes to and from their customers. Otherwise it's the customer, or combat units, who pay the price to secure those areas and routes.

Another among the operational issues learned in Vietnam is that armored units must find better ways of dealing with land mines. Because of the nature of insurgency warfare, the enemy was able to do a great deal of damage with mines, some of which were relatively simple and unsophisticated.

Historically, antiarmor land mines have been a persistent and vexing problem in our Army for which no really satisfactory solution has ever been found. Our failure to solve the problem of mines laid in patterns has been aggravated by our similar failure to cope with random mining tactics. We must find a way to use our experience in Vietnam, regardless of how bitter it may have been to find solutions to the antiarmor mine problem.

Much useful experience was gained in the Vietnam war. We learned once again that combined arms teams are essential and that fighting with troops mounted was advantageous in certain circumstances; often those were not necessarily the traditional circumstances.

As we look to the future it is essential not only that we know the lessons of Vietnam, but that we understand them as well. Understanding them, in their correct context, and relating that to the future will take more time than this seminar can offer. But it must be done. We can no more turn our backs on our experiences and the lessons of Vietnam than we can take those experiences, relate them directly to our next battlefield, and so in the end get ready to fight better the war we just left behind.

The wisdom to learn from experience, without merely getting better prepared to relive that experience, is not easily won. But win it we must. We owe it to ourselves and our countries. More, however, we owe it to the brave men who helped us learn the lessons and paid the price of learning. They left us a large legacy--larger perhaps than we deserve.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

5 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SPECIAL GUEST SPEAKER

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.

VICE CHIEF OF STAFF

UNITED STATES ARMY

## SPECIAL GUEST SPEAKER

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

We live in a dangerous and uncertain world. The economies of the nations of the world have become inextricably tied to each other. As the economies of developing nations grow, the nations become more and more tied to the international economic community for their continued development and their relationships with industrial nations become more complex. With worldwide economic growth, the demand for raw materials, especially energy resources, has increased dramatically. In my own country, for example, in 1940, we were net exporters of oil of about 20K barrels/day. In 1979, we were net importers of about 6 million barrels/day of crude oil and we are an energy rich nation.

Today, there are about 120 large ships in Hampton Roads, Virginia, awaiting berths to load coal. Many countries are almost solely dependent on external sources of energy. Other raw materials that are necessary for a variety of industrial efforts, like titanium, chromium and cobalt, also are in great demand and in limited supply.

The interdependence of the industrial world has created raw material "choke" points that are susceptible to political and military interdiction--and the impact of a crisis in one part of the world can be felt everywhere.

Since each nation has its own interests and those interests are sometimes in conflict with the interests of its neighbor nations, the world of nation states can be a tense place. Superimposed over the world's normal tenseness is the spectre of an expansionist Soviet Union that has undertaken a massive peacetime military build-up, the results of which have been great growth in Soviet military offensive capabilities, coupled with a new and alarming tendency to project power beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Soviet aggressive intervention in Africa and its invasion of Afghanistan are examples. Today, the world's problems are compounded by an explosive situation in the Persian Gulf with open warfare between Iran and Iraq and the consequent dangers to the oil supplies upon which many countries depend. The economic health of the entire world is jeopardized. We do indeed live in a dangerous and uncertain world.

Certainly, the Pacific region is not without its troubled areas. For two examples, in Southeast Asia we see the agony of Kampuchea and the consequent dangers to Thailand's security. In Northeast Asia, we see the continuation of North Korea's aggressive posturing and the threat that implies to the peace of that region. In other countries, communist insurgents continue their attempts to disrupt life for the people and the governments.

On the other hand, when compared to other parts of the world, the Pacific region is a bright spot. The astronomic increases in oil prices put great strains on the economies of most countries in the region but combinations of fundamental health and sound policies have thus far sustained most of those economies. For the United States, the two-way trade with the region continues to grow faster than with other parts of the world.

I want to tell you that the United States has an overriding interest in peace, stability and prosperity in the Pacific region. The United States is a Pacific nation. We have a long Pacific coastline and this beautiful state is in the middle of the ocean. Our trade with the region is at an all time high, nearing \$94 billion last year. In fact, the volume of trade with Asian countries surpasses our trade with the EEC. Likewise, European trade with Asia has increased dramatically over the last decade.

We recognize that American involvement in regional security is necessary and a responsibility. We want American involvement to balance the interests of outside powers and help allow other countries of the region to develop freely along their own national and regional courses.

The United States recognizes the changes in trade patterns, the growing interdependence of the world community and the global nature of the threat to peace. We have a responsibility to reinforce favorable trends. For those of us in the military, this means we must continue to insure stability--in our nations and regions, and by doing so contribute to broader global stability.

For us in the United States Armed Forces, our security ties to the nations of the Pacific region are deep and abiding. Our treaty ties, mutual defense agreements, and security commitments in the region, stretch from the Southwest Pacific to Northeast Asia. We believe those ties not only serve the security interests of the nations involved including our own but also provide wider umbrellas of security for the region as a whole.

We also believe that the close personal and professional ties developed with the members of the armed forces of the nations of the region promote understanding and contribute to the maintenance of peace.

My own personal ties with soldiers of the region have been close and have ranged through most of my military career. They extend from 36 years ago when I shared the same foxhole for 10 days with a New Zealand soldier on the Cassino front in World War II through my last assignment where I had the great honor of commanding the brave soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. GEN Starry and I talked of these ties during the plane ride out here and I told him that some evidence of those ties said something about his age and mine. LTC Victor Mayo, the Philippine Liaison Officer with the UNC in Korea during my tour as UNC Commander, is the son of a Fort Leavenworth classmate of GEN Starry's and mine.

The United States Army is in the midst of a major modernization program designed to improve both our power and our flexibility. Our Army in the years ahead will continue to have a mix of heavy and light divisions. As you heard Monday, we want the light divisions to take advantage of new technology to improve the rapidity with which these divisions can be deployed while at the same time improving their ability to fight. We want to be able to use these divisions quickly to fulfill our treaty commitments in any part of the world. At the same time, we are modernizing our heavy divisions to help our allies preserve the peace by deterring attack by the masses of Soviet armor poised opposite NATO.

Internal defense and development is an excellent theme for this conference. Economic and political stability in the region serve a broad range of common interests for us all. In this vein, we should look at this seminar on two levels. First, as soldiers we have an opportunity to expand our professional vision. The professionalism of a nation's armed forces is a key element in achieving and maintaining internal defense and stability.

We can all contribute to each other's knowledge and we can all learn from these discussions. It is a rare opportunity to hear professionals from a diverse array of situations address a common problem, with highly qualified speakers discussing topics ranging from "Internal Defense of a Nation" from the Thai perspective to the "Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia" as described by the delegation from New Zealand.

Beyond the actual professional lessons, we hope that the US participation and sponsorship highlight continued support by the United States for allies and old friends--and for our interest in real army-to-army cooperation.

The entire Pacific Armies Management Seminar series is a chance for us, the professional military establishment to help ensure peace in the region, to roll up our sleeves and tackle tough problems and make strides toward effective cooperation. We need to recognize that we all have problems--and at times, economic and political problems tend to make us look inward and reduce foreign involvement. We military leaders need to recognize our individual responsibilities in our collective effort. It is a common effort. It sometimes requires sacrifice. It always requires an open dialogue among us.

Each country has a unique domestic situation. In the United States, for example, there are competing interests for shares of the budget that in turn places constraints on security assistance. At the same time, some countries face domestic problems in receiving assistance that may be available. Increasing costs and increasingly sophisticated weapons technology jeopardize interoperability of systems on which much of current security assistance depends. A further complication is that US production life of older equipment is approaching an end.

Another tough issue is intelligence exchange and cooperation. We all understand the need for security. But there have been times when valuable information has been treated as too secret to share, and consequently, was never used. It is a difficult and sensitive area. But I submit to you that we can make substantial improvements in our cooperation and as the Korean officers know, I am personally dedicated to improving that type of cooperation.

Thus far, we have talked about the professional military benefits of our efforts here--the actual lessons learned and the potential for improved army-to-army cooperation. There is a second level from which we can view this seminar. There is another larger benefit to be derived from that second level. We are more than a collection of people with a mechanical interest in the same topic. We come from different countries and cultures and are their representatives. We are a microcosm of the broad diversity of the region and we represent the common interest in peace and stability.

Our professional dialogue is a significant element of the overall dialogue between nations and it is a practical way to promote mutual understanding. While we are working together, we also are getting to know one another. And that element may be more important than any single technical lesson learned.

At the senior level, many of us have developed a mutual understanding from long years of association but it is our responsibility to help promote understanding among our subordinates looking to cooperation in future years. Every junior officer who is involved in combined training or an exchange may be considered an investment in the future. The years slip by all too quickly and these young officers will become senior officers. Their wisdom will guide our armies in the future. Our support now can build a solid base of understanding for our nations in the future.

I want you to know that the leadership of the US Army is dedicated to the broadening and deepening of channels of communication and cooperation among the armies of the Pacific region. Mindful of the limited resources available and your concerns over training costs, we will work to reduce barriers to exchanges and schooling in US Army schools. We want to communicate with you either through General Wolff here in Hawaii, through General Robinson in Japan, General Wickham in Korea, through the various MAAG chiefs and attaches in your countries, or directly to General Meyer or me.

I wish you continued success for the remainder of the seminar and a continued enjoyable stay here in Hawaii, one of the finest of our 50 states. The seminar has been a stimulating and broadening experience for me. Thank you for including me. I am sorry I cannot stay for the last 2 days, but I must return to Washington to take part in another important exercise.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

FEATURED ADDRESS

MAJOR GENERAL BRIAN M. POANANGA

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

NEW ZEALAND ARMY



## FEATURED ADDRESS

Major General Brian M. Poananga

General Wolff, gentlemen, I can't let this opportunity pass without commenting on the value of this seminar--there is no doubt in my mind that it is a most successful forum for dealing with matters of common interest and, there is also no doubt that revolutionary warfare is a matter of great importance to us all as well. The seminar also brings together people who individually and collectively represent military professionals of the highest order; the sort of people ideally suited to developing a defence philosophy against forces whose aim it is to overthrow the legitimate government of a state. I am delighted too, to be associated with you all in these deliberations. But, to be quite frank, having reviewed the excellent presentations made by the distinguished speakers, I feel rather like I am not sure that I can guarantee to make my address interesting. In any event I have no wish to plough fields which have already been thoroughly ploughed. I have therefore decided to take a rather different and rather oblique route to that followed by the other speakers--to address the vital element in any discussion about this important subject which I don't think has been given very much attention during this seminar. The sort of thing which the editor of the Honolulu Advertiser must have had in mind when he wrote on Wednesday his editorial covering the recent elections in the United States and I quote: "Perhaps the most impressive fact (which arises) from all this is the election showed the true power of a democratic nation lies in the ability of its people to peacefully change their government in free choice. It is an awesome power and that has to be a comfort no matter what side you were on." In short the power of the honest ballot box.

This brings me back to my earlier comment about legitimacy--the legitimate government of a state. It is only when this condition is obtained that a sure defence can be constructed against revolutionary forces. And, I use the term revolutionary forces advisedly even though I know it is no longer fashionable--because it is the revolutionary's "cause" or "causes" which must be eliminated if a successful defence is to be mounted. This is a "governmental" problem and it is the "governmental" factor which is the crux of the matter when dealing with revolutionaries. And, I would poach the view of the new President of the United States when he said that what is needed is "good government" not "good politics"--there is a distinction. And, it is this element that the seminar seems to have avoided. I suspect that part of the reluctance of the seminar to address this aspect stems from our reluctance as soldiers to get involved in matters which we consider lie outside our military responsibilities. Yet in my considered view a thorough understanding of the underlying government philosophy is fundamental to the effectiveness of operations against those who wish to overthrow a legally constituted government. For, I am convinced that without that fundamental basis the bravest soldiers with the best equipment and tactics and the strongest motivation will fail. In any event "government" is too important to be left to "politicians"--to interpret rather freely President Reagan's comment mentioned earlier. Or put another way--the force of arms cannot make up for what government fails to do.

I suspect that the terminology also causes problems. I was given today a copy of a draft paper prepared for the seminar titled "Concept and Doctrine - Internal Defense and Development Defense." I am uncomfortable with the terminology not only because it requires me to learn new names, and descriptions of activities I had lived with for most of my soldiering days, but also because I can find no reference in it to the revolutionary warfare. For examples, "Phases of Insurgency" now cover the whole range of what I have always known as revolutionary warfare. I think the distinction is important and I find it extraordinary that a country like the United States whose first resort to arms was in a successful revolutionary war against the British should now wish to denigrate this success by referring to that war as insurgency. Joking aside, the distinction as I have said is important. And, we must get out of the habit of labelling revolutionary movements per se as bad--to continue to do so could well have us fighting in the wrong corner.

Finally, I wish to make one further observation. Looking back and reviewing our mistakes is only valuable if the results can be projected into the future. For example, I wonder how many of this audience have looked at the recent revolutionary war in Rhodesia, now called Zimbabwe, which David Maloney has just spoken about. The question that intrigues me is a simple one--to what extent did individual weariness of the guerrilla war there bring about the collapse of the Muzorewa Government? Or put another way, to what degree did the vote for the Mugabe Government reflect nothing more than the simple wish of the people to stop the killing; which only the guerrillas could guarantee. But back to terminology in this context. I am sure that Mao Tse Tung did not lightly describe his revolutionary war as protracted war. We do not seem to be prepared for the long haul.

As I said at the outset I sought in this short address to avoid re-ploughing the ground you have all covered so well and to stimulate some original thought on this most complex of subjects. I hope I have done so but more important I hope we can open up the problem and free the debate.

PANEL ASSIGNMENTS

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

PANEL I

\*COL Felix A. BRAWNER  
COL Mohd Azizur RAHMAN  
COL A.T.S. SIAGIAN  
COL Daniel B. LABRADO  
COL James D.C. CHANG  
COL John M. FITZGERALD  
LTC D.W.S. MOLONEY  
LTC NG Jui Ping  
LTC SOMBAT Prasobnetr  
LTC Kiyoshi ICHIKAWA  
LTC KIM Choon Nam  
LTC Kazuo KOIKE  
CPT George BROWN  
\*\*LTC Karl PIOTROWSKI

PANEL II

\*COL Modh KALAM Azad Bin Mohd Taib  
COL ADAM Saleh  
COL Richard H. HOOKER  
COL Edgardo A. ALFABETO  
COL Eugenio A. OCAMPO, Jr.  
COL Moss M. IKEDA  
LTC Anthony L. BIRKS  
LTC Noriaki HIRASAKI  
LTC CHARN Boonprasert  
LTC KIM Moo Woong  
LTC Paul SOMA  
LTC John B. HASEMAN  
LTC William E. CATES  
MAJ LIM Hng Kiang  
2LT Mailefihi TUKU'AO  
\*\*LTC Ronald D. TURNER

PANEL 3

\*COL J.P.A. DEIGHTON  
COL HARSONO Natawardaja  
COL SONGSERM Whaisoka  
COL A.R. Tony HUAI  
COL NAM Hyung Wook  
COL Cirilo O. OROPESA  
COL Franklin W. COLLINS  
LTC Herbert G. THOMS  
LTC Charles SHAW  
LTC Joe S. FALKNER  
MAJ F.M. PITARO  
MAJ Frederick A. DREW  
Mr. TAN Peng Yam  
LT Paula MOTOTO  
\*\*LTC Robert K. TYSON

ROVING PANEL MEMBERS

LTC Norman L. CUSTARD  
LTC Gary A. DEBAUCHE  
LTC Thomas J. GODFREY  
MAJ (Ret) Stanley HYROWSKI  
MAJ James G. MEIKLE

\*Chairman  
\*\*Recorder

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS AND REPORTS

TUESDAY - 4 November 1980

## PANEL I

Discussion Topics:

4 November 1980

1. Insurgent Organizations, Goals and Functions.
2. Governmental Organizations, Goals and Functions.
3. Define Internal Defense and Internal Development.
4. Role of Military, Paramilitary Forces.

Insurgent Organizations, Goals and Functions: This topic was not discussed in detail by Panel I because a decision was made to concentrate on a discussion of topics 2 and 4. A trend of increased use of terrorism by insurgents and an upsurge in worldwide urban insurgent movements was noted.

Governmental Organizations, Goals and Functions: Internal defense organizations have a dual function; social and military. There is a trend toward less use of military force during internal defense operations. The role of the civil affairs organizational element is becoming more predominant. Emphasis in organizing for internal defense should be on the use of civilian paramilitary organizations with a "self help" function. Direct volunteer involvement in internal defense programs that support the established government by the mass populace is the most effective means of countering insurgent movements. Specifically, limited police powers should be given to members of such "home defense" organizations to enhance their prestige and effectiveness. Any delegation of police powers to nonprofessionals must be carefully limited and closely supervised by trained professionals. A specific goal of these organizations should be enhancement of the spirit of nationalism. An attempt should be made to inculcate the members of these organizations with positive values, such as civil obedience and communal spirit, so that they become model citizens and serve as inspirational examples for the mass public. The government must organize for internal defense to deal with a wide spectrum of anti-government, anti-social activities. A full range of countermeasure options must be made available to government leaders. The first option should always be toward a socio-economic solution. Escalating insurgent problems call for the availability of a wide range of countermeasures to include paramilitary home defense units, police auxiliaries, specially-trained police units, specially-trained military units, and conventional military units. Direct military force should be used only after all other less violent options prove ineffective. An attempt should always be made to deal with an internal defense threat by using police forces before committing regular military forces. In organizing for internal defense, doctrine should not be followed blindly; a large degree of flexibility should be retained in organizational structure and employment.

Define Internal Defense and Internal Development: No attempt was made to discuss this topic since panel members felt the definitions that appear in the various armies' doctrinal publications were fairly consistent and clearly understood.

Role of Military, Paramilitary Forces: Paramilitary forces consisting of deputized civilians with limited police powers and trained to do certain specific activities such as search and seizure, riot control, and key point defense, are becoming more and more popular as an internal defense organization. The role of these "Civilian Home Defense Forces" as a tool of nation building is quite significant. Established paramilitary organizations of this type provide the government with an important channel of communications with the mass populace. This communication should be two-way so that the people's grievances can be passed upward through established, recognized, channels rather than through the actions of dissident groups. The paramilitary organization must have a dual, social and military, function. Use of family-type leadership structures is most effective. Paramilitary organizations provide a convenient, affordable mobilization reserve. Paramilitary training and tactics should be flexible and tailored to the local situation. Police forces are the prime paramilitary internal defense force. Police should be closely involved in organizing and supervising other paramilitary forces since these other units will support the police in times of emergency. Regular military forces should also be given some training in police procedures so they can effectively operate with the police during emergencies. The regular military force should be trained primarily for external defense, only special military units should receive extensive internal defense training. The national leadership should carefully and fully define the role of the military in internal defense and set the priorities that determine how much military effort will be devoted to training for or engaging in internal defense operations. Only specially trained unconventional military units should be drawn from the regular military force structure and committed to internal defense operations. When so committed, regular military forces should be carefully controlled and operate closely with police and other paramilitary organizations.

## PANEL II

Discussion Topic:

4 November 1980

### Terrorism

Scope: Panel II chose to investigate terrorism in the context of an insurgent situation. International terrorism was not addressed. This session was used to lay the groundwork for the 5 November 1980 meeting in which the control of terrorism was to be discussed. Four areas were addressed during the first panel session; namely, definition of terrorism, aims of terrorism, how terrorists operate, and some examples of terrorist operations.

Definition of Terrorism: The panel decided to first describe characteristics of terrorism in order to arrive at a definition. The first ingredient of terrorism was that of violence or the threat of violence as a method of intimidation. Second, it was agreed that terrorism is illegal. Third, terrorism contains an element of premeditation, that is, terrorist acts are planned. Fourth, terrorism has a political end. After considering these characteristics, the definition of terrorism arrived at was "planned violence or intimidation used illegally for political ends." While there was not total agreement with this definition, it was used as a basis for further discussion.

Aims of Terrorism: The panel then discussed what insurgents hope to achieve by the use of terrorism. It was concluded that terrorism in an insurgency has four general aims -- all of which are interrelated in terms of achieving the political end. First, terrorism is used as a means of drawing attention to the terrorists' existence and their cause. In this context the panel envisioned terrorist acts being committed to attract the media and to attract external sympathy and support. The second general aim of terrorism is to destabilize the government. In this respect the panel saw a particular aim as being to highlight government weakness -- especially its inability to protect the people. Further, terrorism is used to eliminate potential opponents -- government leaders and officials -- and to lower police and military morale. An additional factor contributing to destabilizing the government can be over-reaction on its part resulting in repressive measures. The third general aim, that of demoralizing the people, is similar to the aim just described. The panel saw terrorism being used to keep the people cowed, to force them -- if they don't actively support the insurgents -- at least to remain neutral and noninvolved in supporting the government. In this context, a correlation was seen between this aim and that of destabilizing the government in the sense that demoralized people tend to lose confidence in the government. In losing confidence, people tend to give less support to the government so that ultimately an atmosphere of impending collapse is induced. The fourth aim is the raising of insurgent morale. This aim has special relevance if the campaign is not going well for the insurgents and there is a need to steady the ranks of the less-committed.

Modus Operandi. Having defined terrorism and discussed its aims, the panel then examined terrorist methods of operation. Two general types of terrorism were noted -- selective and nonselective. Selective terrorist acts considered included assassination, kidnapping, extortion, bombing, intimidation, and destruction of utilities/facilities. Nonselective acts discussed included bombings, shootings, and arson.

Examples and Effects: Having discussed the means terrorists use to achieve their aims, the panel then looked at some specific acts of terrorism with which panel members were familiar and related these acts to appropriate aims. One example related to a bombing of a national monument in Kuala Lumpur in the mid-70's. That act seemed to be designed to attract attention to the insurgents, to raise their morale, and to embarrass the government. In Vietnam the widespread assassination of local officials was designed to destabilize the government's position by its removal of opponents and also serve as a lesson to those who might lend support to the government. As far as demoralizing the people is concerned, the panel recalled the bombing in Bangkok and the grenade-throwing incidents in Mindanao earlier this year. Finally, the group turned back to September 1965 when terrorist murders by the Communist Party of Indonesia decimated the top leadership of that country.



### PANEL III

Discussion Topics:

4 November 1980

1. Insurgent Strategies.
2. Government Strategies.
3. Population and Resource Control.
4. Public Support.

Insurgent Strategies: Panel III began its discussion based on the definition of insurgent strategies that had been presented by the representative from USAIMA. These strategies were left, mass and right. In addition to these three, a fourth type of strategy, termed the "mix strategy" was discussed by the panel. This strategy as the term implies, is a mixture of the three other strategies. It was asserted that no model strategy in the pure form could be executed by an insurgent group. Having general agreement on the types of insurgent strategies, the panel discussed the many factors that influence the strategy adopted by an insurgent force. The environment was foremost. Variations included whether the population was urban or rural and in which type area the discontented population live. The education level of the population would also affect the strategy. Other environmental items included types of people, religious and/or ethnic groupings, economic status, and real or perceived discontentment. Other factors included objectives of the insurgents, population support, external support, the legitimacy of the government in power, economic development and intelligence. In the panel's subsequent discussions, it was asserted that the ability to gather information and produce intelligence was a driving factor in both the success of the insurgency or conversely the success on the part of the government of defeating the insurgency.

Conclusion Topic One: The panel concluded their discussions on this topic by identifying four main points. Insurgent strategy will be dictated by many factors, and identifying the insurgent strategy will assist in determining the appropriate solutions. Caution must be exercised when assessing strategies to avoid stereotyping. This might cloud the evaluation of the insurgents' actions, thereby resulting in an inappropriate response to the insurgent activities. Flexibility must be maintained in order to respond to changes in insurgent strategies.

Government Strategies: The second topic discussed was the general principles that the government could use in developing its strategy to counter an insurgency. It was stated that the most important item in developing a strategy was to identify the problem. The government must not only identify real problems but must address problems merely perceived by the populace. In the execution of a counterinsurgency campaign the perceived problems may be as real to the population as actual conditions. Solutions must address the full spectrum of social, political, and economic areas. Minimum force should be part of the strategy since excessive use of force would surely be used against the government

by the insurgents in their propaganda. A recurring theme of Panel III was the importance of the civil government. Combating insurgency must be directed by the civilian government with the military force supporting the civilian program. Counterinsurgency will be a long-term commitment. The government must seize opportunities and capitalize on success. The people must be kept informed of successful actions and also the actions that may have to be delayed due to economic, political or other contrariety. As part of any government strategy, the rehabilitation of returnees must have a high priority. Assistance to returnees must include providing governmental support in reestablishing them in their chosen profession. This is extremely important to reduce popular support of the insurgents.

Conclusion Topic Two: The first conclusion and most important was that once problems have been identified, they must be solved. There must, however, be a flexible approach by the government. Whenever possible imagination should be used in solving problems; making it more difficult for the insurgents to counter the actions. The conflicting demands on public resources during a counterinsurgency action is a difficult dilemma for any regime. There must be a well planned program that makes the maximum use of resources to achieve optimum results. The conflict between developmental programs and military programs must be closely monitored to achieve the desired results. Explanation of lack of action on a particular program must be provided to the people along with a detailed program which will address the problem in the future. Another principle that influenced the government strategy was the level of desired destruction of the insurgents. Total destruction would be ideal but the rendering of the insurgency to a manageable level may have to be an acceptable substitute. The final conclusion was the use of media. It is important not only to solve a problem but also to inform everyone that the problem has been resolved. The effective use of media to "get the word out" will assist in developing support for the government.

Panel III did not discuss Topics 3 and 4.

PANEL III SLIDES

SLIDE 1

INSURGENT STRATEGIES

GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES

SLIDE 2

INSURGENT STRATEGIES:

LEFT - MASS - RIGHT - MIX

SLIDE 3

FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGY:

ENVIRONMENT

INSURGENT OBJECTIVES

POPULATION SUPPORT

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

GOVERNMENT STATUS

INTELLIGENCE

ECONOMICS

SLIDE 4

CONCLUSION TOPIC ONE:

MANY FACTORS AFFECT STRATEGY

IDENTIFYING STRATEGY IS IMPORTANT

USE CAUTION WHEN IDENTIFYING STRATEGY

MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY

SLIDE 5

GOVERNMENT STRATEGY

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

IDENTIFY PROBLEM  
SOCIAL-POLITICAL-ECONOMIC  
MINIMUM FORCE  
CIVILIAN LEAD  
LONG TERM  
INFORM PEOPLE

SLIDE 6

CONCLUSION TOPIC TWO:

SOLVE PROBLEM  
FLEXIBILITY  
IMAGINATION  
USE RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY  
USE MEDIA

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS AND REPORTS

WEDNESDAY - 5 November 1980

## PANEL I

Discussion Topics:

5 November 1980

1. Tactical Operation.
2. Conventional Units versus Special Units.
3. Training for Counterinsurgent Operations.
4. Military Initiative.

Tactical Operations: This topic was not discussed since panel members felt that existing doctrine clearly deals with this subject.

Conventional Units versus Special Units: There should be three categories of units available to the national leadership to deal with an internal threat; conventional units trained only for external defense operations, conventional units which have received some special training in internal defense operations, and special units trained only for internal defense operations. The mix of these three type units in the force structure of any given army will be determined by the national leadership's perception of the various threats. Which units are actually employed will be dependent upon factors such as the degree of specialization of the mission, amount of time available to prepare for the mission, size of the force required, and existing socio-political situation. Police forces should develop a full range of specialized units such as sniper squads, SWAT teams, anti-riot squads, anti-terrorist teams, and psychological operations units so as to reduce the need for training conventional units in those skills. Special units are expensive in terms of both money, equipment, and time. Special units must be retrained before they can be used in conventional operations. Conditions such as homogeneity of the population and historical development of the nation influence the decision to use conventional or special units. In training special units the need for specialized techniques in dealing with minorities should not be overlooked. Conventional units are better for combat-type operations dealing with direct use of force to eliminate a threat. Special units should be used for reconnaissance and intelligence-type missions. Special units should be small and self-sustaining. It is best not to modify conventional units to deal with internal defense missions, but instead to create entirely new, special units with special equipment and training. A careful analysis of the threat is the key to organizing for internal defense. Special units must be formed to deal with different aspects of the threat and the overall approach must remain flexible with the capability for rapid tailoring of special task forces to counter frequently changing insurgent tactics.

Training for Counterinsurgent Operations: Specialized training is definitely necessary in dealing with the early stages of an insurgent movement, particularly for counterinsurgent units operating in an urban environment. An army attempting to develop a counterinsurgency training program should study closely the experiences of other armies in fighting insurgents and select techniques that are applicable to

the local situation. Any training program must produce a number of different type special units to give commanders a flexible range of options to use in countering often changing insurgent tactics. Counterinsurgency training should give equal attention to both the social and military aspects of counterinsurgency. Stress in training should include restraint on the use of force, psychological operations, and special intelligence techniques. Counterinsurgency training requires specially qualified instructors, many of whom may not be military personnel, as well as special equipment. All personnel involved in counterinsurgency operations should receive special training.

Military Initiative: It is extremely difficult to take the initiative away from the insurgents. The military should maintain a low profile in internal defense operations allowing civilian police and paramilitary forces to take the lead. Initiative is best taken away from the insurgents through eliminating their support base within the populace. Elimination of this support is best done through the use of techniques other than the application of military force.

#### PANEL I SLIDE

#### FACTORS AFFECTING THE MIX OF CONVENTIONAL AND SPECIAL UNITS

1. REQUIREMENT FOR SPECIAL UNITS
  - A. NATURE OF THREAT
  - B. DEGREE OF INTENSITY
  - C. TYPES OF MISSIONS
  - D. DEGREE OF SPECIALIZATION REQUIRED
  - E. TRANSITION TIME
2. ABILITY TO FORM SPECIAL UNITS
  - A. RESOURCES AVAILABLE
  - B. SIZE OF FORCES
  - C. EFFECTS OF RESOURCE RE-ALLOCATION
  - D. TIME AND TURNOVER
3. OTHER FACTORS
  - A. HOMOGENEITY OF COUNTRY
  - B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTRY

## PANEL II

Discussion Topics:

5 November 1980

### Controlling and Combatting Terrorism

Introduction: The panel discussions were a natural follow-on to the previous day's work during which an agreed upon definition of terrorism was formulated, aims of terrorists discussed, and several case study possibilities identified. This day's discussions centered around the several case studies in order to learn lessons from them.

Case Study, Malaysia: In 1975, immediately after the end of the Vietnam War, the national monument located in Kuala Lumpur was destroyed by a bomb. Evidence showed that the perpetrators were Maoist insurgents. Ostensibly, the aim of the terrorists was to show that the communists were both active and visible. The Government of Malaysia responded to this terrorist act by announcing that the terrorists did direct harm to the people because the monument was constructed with money contributed by the public; by launching a fund drive to raise money for the reconstruction of the monument; by using a local firm to reconstruct the monument (the original monument was constructed by a foreign firm); and by launching intelligence operations to identify the perpetrators. In this instance case the government did everything on its own to counter the possible negative effects of the terrorist act. Looking from hindsight, one possible action which the government could have done was to enlist some friendly civic organizations to denounce the act of the terrorists. This would reinforce the government efforts and create heightened credibility and public condemnation.

Case Study, Thailand: On August 1980, a bomb was exploded in a railroad station in Bangkok. The government responded with the following actions: Identified the perpetrators and their aims, which were to embarrass the government, to show the capability of doing what they want with impunity, and to raise the morale of the communists. The police undertook overt and covert operations to apprehend the perpetrators; assisted the victims and their families with material help, which was reinforced when the Princess personally presented assistance; and convinced the media not to sensationalize the case. In this particular case, the government should have also undertaken security measures to prevent further terrorist attacks. Fortunately, there were no follow-up terrorist actions.

Case Study, Vietnam: The third case is that of Vietnam. The Vietcong launched a continuing program of assassinations in the villages. The targets were public officials and school teachers. The security forces launched the following preventive programs: Operations against the terrorists themselves in the tradition of search and destroy types of actions; protecting the people by separating them from the terrorists by posting security force detachments in the vicinity of the villages; and a resettlement program. These programs were never



completely effective. The panel noted that the insurgents tended to assassinate the best officials (who represented the central government well) and the bad officials (thus "helping" the people). As a result, only mediocre officials who were smart enough to play both sides were found in the disputed villages. This turned out to be counterproductive because the civil government was emasculated by incompetence.

Case Study, The Philippines: In this case the panel considered a series of grenade-throwing incidents aimed directly at an innocent populace. These incidents were perpetrated by the separatist movement and communist terrorists in places where people gather--marketplaces, theaters, parties, etc. The response of the government consisted of the following acts: legal processes--investigation, arrest, filing of charges in court; immediate publication of true and accurate account; publication of actions of the government to assist the victims; institution of searches, checkpoints, and dragnets. Constabulary/police contingents conducted these police actions in a very courteous manner. They conducted continuous intelligence operations; imposed a death penalty on convicted terrorists; and gave sparingly and cautiously of cash awards leading to the capture of terrorists.

Observations: From the four case studies presented above, the conclusion that can be drawn is that there emerges commonality of government responses to terrorist acts. Further, that the unifying thread of all these responses is the desire of governments to immediately neutralize the effects of terrorism. The following generalizations are cautiously presented by Panel 2 as viable ones insofar as response to terrorists as we know them today: quick and positive governmental action; reassert the capability of government to take action/reestablish confidence in government; get support from the civic sector; police/military action; media, an important consideration--true and accurate reports to the population; good intelligence measures; create an atmosphere of "business as usual"; and an incentives/awards program.

The analysis above has one crucial assumption; i.e., that terrorism in the future will have characteristics similar to those of the past. If not, then the governments have to rely on their imagination and innovative creativeness to respond to terrorism whose dimensions are still unknown.

### PANEL III

Discussion Topics:

5 November 1980

1. Psychological and Counterpsychological Operations.
2. Planning Effective Psychological Operations.
3. Coordination and Control of Internal Defense and Development.
4. Continuity of Command.

Psychological and Counterpsychological Operations/Planning Effective Psychological Operations: The panel first discussed a combination of topics one and two. Psychological operations, to be effective must meet certain criteria. First, the operation must be aimed at a target audience. In order for this to take place, detailed information must be known about the people. Each action must then be evaluated to determine the anticipated reactions by the group. A national theme must be agreed upon by the heads of government, with sufficient guidance given to provide continuity of the program from the highest to the lowest level and yet permit flexibility during decentralized operations. All themes must be integrated, they must employ the truth and refute enemy propaganda. In order for the soldiers to effectively implement and support psychological operations, they must receive training in what the themes are, how to implement the themes and the desired results. As doctrine dictates, psychological operations must be an instrument of national policy to achieve national objectives.

Coordination and Control of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD): In order to establish the framework for the next discussion, definitions of internal defense and internal development were discussed and general agreement was reached (slide 1). It was felt that internal defense must precede internal development. The degree of security necessary was not discussed, just the fact that without some form of security the work done for development purposes may be undone before the desired results can be achieved. There were several reasons given to support the premise that IDAD operations must be understood and approved at the national level. These were to provide continuity of programs, to influence resource allocation, to insure a stable framework for the issuance of guidance, to establish goals and objectives and to provide for the integration of all factors in internal defense and development.

Conclusions: Each IDAD situation will dictate what methods are best used to solve the problems. There is no all encompassing national prescription for IDAD operations. In order for psychological operations to be effective they must support and therefore become an integral part of IDAD. Some form of internal defense must precede internal development. Finally, IDAD must be initiated and supported at the national level to provide for continuity of actions.

PANEL III SLIDES

SLIDE #1

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COUNTERPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
PLANNING EFFECTIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS  
COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

SLIDE 2

PSYOPS/COUNTERPSYOPS/PLANNING

TARGET AUDIENCE  
CENTRAL THEME  
HEAD OF STATE APPROVAL  
TOTAL INTEGRATION OF ACTIONS  
EMPHASIZE THE TRUTH  
SOLDIERS NEED SPECIAL TRAINING  
DESIRED RESULTS KNOWN BY ALL  
MUST ACHIEVE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

SLIDE 3

COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

DEFINITIONS

INTERNAL DEFENSE - SAFE AREA  
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT - ACTIONS INJECTED INTO THE SAFE AREA

SLIDE 4

PLANNING POINTS

INTERNAL DEFENSE FIRST - INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT FOLLOWS  
INITIATION AND APPROVAL AT NATIONAL LEVEL

PROVIDES CONTINUITY  
RESOURCE ALLOCATION  
GUIDANCE  
GOALS AND OBJECTIVES  
INTEGRATED ACTIONS

SLIDE 5

CONCLUSIONS

- NO NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
- PSYOPS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF IDAD
- IDAD MUST BE INITIATED AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL TO PROVIDE CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS
- INTERNAL DEFENSE MUST PRECEDE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS AND REPORTS

THURSDAY - 6 November 1980

## PANEL I

Discussion Topics:

6 November 1980

1. Mobilization Planning.
2. Determination of Force Structure Deficiencies.
3. Commonality.

Mobilization Planning: This topic was not discussed since the panel members agreed the scope of the topic exceeded the time available for discussion.

Determination of Force Structure Deficiencies: This topic was not discussed in detail since panel members felt that force structuring to deal with internal defense problems must be tailored to the local situation and therefore was country specific. In general any force committed to internal defense operations should consist of small, specially trained units covering a broad spectrum of counterinsurgency skills so as to give the commander maximum flexibility in tailoring task forces to deal with rapidly changing local situations.

Commonality: Commonality of equipment and doctrine is a desirable goal. Achieving commonality of equipment is often difficult due to economic and legal problems which may require the military to procure equipment from local manufacturers or preclude purchase from certain foreign sources. Efforts by the NATO armies to achieve commonality have a valuable spin-off for Pacific armies since armies in the Asia-Pacific region frequently procure equipment from the NATO countries as well as consider NATO doctrine in formulating their own doctrine. A key to achieving commonality is better communications. Common understanding of military terms will enhance achieving commonality of doctrine. An excellent method for improving communications and interoperability is through participation in joint/combined exercises. Exchange of instructors and technicians is a good method for developing common understanding of doctrinal concepts, exchanging ideas, and promoting friendship. Exchange of doctrinal publications is also a valuable means of increasing interoperability and moving toward the goal of commonality of doctrine. Asian-Pacific armies draw on the US Army training base for much of their doctrine, but they should also draw on each other's experiences as well as that of other free world armies. More licensing to smaller nations for co-production of weapons systems and equipment by the industrialized nations would assist in achieving greater commonality of equipment. In the final analysis, each nation must decide to what degree it will seek commonality and with whom. Historical differences and international political factors complicate the situation but should not deter military efforts to achieve greater commonality to enhance their ability to conduct coalition warfare with friendly and allied armies. There are many beneficial side effects to be realized through efforts to achieve commonality. Even if total commonality were achieved, the exchange of ideas, enhanced mutual understanding, and increased friendship, promoted by interoperability efforts, are valuable spin-offs.

PANEL I SLIDES

SLIDE 1

FACTORS AFFECTING COMMONALITY

- NATURE OF MILITARY REQUIREMENT
- STAGE OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- DEGREE OF NONMILITARY TIES
- HISTORICAL FACTORS

SLIDE 2

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF COMMONALITY

- COLLECTIVE APPROACH TO COMMON THREAT
- REDUCE ECONOMIC BURDEN
- MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
- IMAGE OF REGIONAL ALLIANCE
- INCREASE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY
- TENDENCY TO NEGLECT DIFFERENCES

SLIDE 3

TYPES OF COOPERATION

- MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
- LOOSE COOPERATION
- CLOSE COOPERATION

## PANEL II

Discussion Topic: Reserve/Territorial Forces

6 November 1980

Scope: The panel decided to take a broad look at reserve forces, since the types of such forces are so different throughout the Pacific. The seven broad areas discussed are amplified upon below.

Definition: The expression "a pool of trained military manpower" was accepted, although it was recognized that the form this manpower takes can vary widely. The panel chose to limit its considerations to "part-time" soldiers, as opposed to the Vietnam experience with regional and popular force soldiers who were sometimes fully utilized for long periods of combat.

Role of Reserve Forces: The following roles for reserve forces were identified and discussed: Homeland defense; reinforcing regular forces in wartime (individual and unit fill); augmenting regular force units (specialist individuals and units); deployment in times of natural disasters and civil emergencies; and assistance in civic action projects.

Management of Reserve Forces: It was concluded that high density units (e.g. infantry) should be organized on an area basis. Low density units (e.g. vehicle maintenance) should also be organized in this manner, but the area from which they are drawn must be larger. Very highly specialized units (e.g. electronic maintenance) may need to be drawn from even a larger area. Control of reserve forces needs to be centralized at the Defense Department level insofar as planning is concerned. Regular force involvement is considered essential in the formal assistance and sponsorship. Since employment of reserve forces will be directed through the standing chain of command, control of these forces in peacetime should be through this same chain of command. Reserve forces can be composed generally of conscripts, of selected conscripts (to fill very specialized positions), of specially trained volunteers, and of retired personnel or personnel who have served in the regular forces and have completed their tours. Several armies have provisions for using the training and experience of their retired regular army officers - others have no provisions for this. A national mobilization scheme, planned and practiced, is required.

Integration: Reserve units can be fully integrated as part of an active unit (e.g. the third battalion in a task force); they can stand alone, only being coordinated at high levels by the regular organization; or they can be used as replacement units. The panel felt that the goal should be the greatest integration possible.

Training: Unit training can be done alone or together with regular force units at specially designed reserve training depots or at the regular force location. Individual training over and above that gained from participation in unit training should be augmented by formal military courses (a correspondence course program is applicable in many cases).



Problems: The problems discussed appeared to apply to most armies. They include lack of money and hence a lack of facilities and equipment; problems in recruitment (in some cases); maintaining a high level of efficiency of individuals and units (training problems); problems obtaining the right manpower; and problems in managing the personnel available. The group agreed that reserve forces are an extremely valuable, even vital, element in a nation's defense posture. Better planning and increased emphasis on reserve forces will pay defense benefits that far outweigh the efforts required.

### PANEL III

#### Discussion Topics:

6 November 1980

1. Joint Combined Operations.
2. Cooperative Training Efforts.
3. Other Cooperative Initiatives.

Joint Combined Operations: To establish common ground for the third discussion, Panel III agreed to the definition on slide two. It was determined that there were many potential problems in conducting joint and combined operations. This situation was highlighted by the fact that even within a nation's armed forces such as the Army and Navy, different terminology creates difficulties. This situation may be amplified when language differences are inserted into the equation. Problems of culture, customs, and habits could create misunderstanding that would reduce the overall effectiveness of a combined force. The logistics of supporting different types of equipment creates unique stresses on an already overburdened system. The inability to use each other's ammunition and spare parts would require a unique logistics system for each piece of equipment. Operating procedures, organization differences, doctrine, and tactics all impact on the effectiveness of the combined forces. The exchange of intelligence between national forces is as critical as it is within national forces. One dilemma that confronts nations involved in combined operations is the category of intelligence entitled "No Foreign Dissemination." This was viewed as something that probably would not be changed, however, close scrutiny of what information is not distributed will reduce the effect of this situation on the exchange of information.

Proposed solutions to these problems emphasized the need for many of the programs that are already in being. Combined exercises and conferences require all participants to work with other nation's equipment and procedures. Exchange of units for training provides the environment for gaining insights into each others' methods. Personnel exchanges, as well as attendance at each other's training courses will assist the understanding of methods of operations. The ongoing programs to produce combined operating instruction manuals should be expanded. Total commonality is generally impossible given the differing circumstances of the countries in PACOM, but some standardization can be helpful. Command post exercises and the exchange of liaison officers will assist in the exchange of operational methods.

Cooperation Training Efforts: These programs provide flexibility for forces and better prepare armies for possible contingencies. A term new to many of the panel members, rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) would be clarified during exchanges. As PAMS demonstrates, one of the main things that happens when soldiers get together is an exchange of ideas. Better understanding of each other promotes trust and confidence.

Conclusions: The principal conclusion of the third discussion was the importance of being prepared to conduct combined operations. The exchange of operating methods and procedures enhances all armies operations.

The final topic was addressed as it relates to PAMS. Although there was no consensus throughout Panel III's discussions, there was agreement on one point. PAMS provided an excellent opportunity for learning about each other's armies. Its strength is in the exchange of ideas in a noncompetitive environment over a long period of time. The more we work together, the better that we will be able to conduct combined operations when such operations are required.

#### PANEL III SLIDES

##### SLIDE 1

#### DISCUSSION TOPICS

JOINT COMBINED OPERATIONS

COOPERATIVE TRAINING EFFORTS

##### SLIDE 2

#### DEFINITIONS

JOINT - OPERATIONS INVOLVING TWO OR MORE SERVICES

COMBINED - OPERATIONS INVOLVING TWO OR MORE NATIONS

JOINT COMBINED - OPERATIONS OF TWO OR MORE SERVICES OF TWO OR MORE COUNTRIES

SLIDE 3

PROBLEM AREAS

LANGUAGE

CULTURE - CUSTOMS - HABITS

EQUIPMENT

OPERATING PROCEDURES

COMMAND & CONTROL

ORGANIZATIONS

DOCTRINE & TACTICS

INTELLIGENCE

SLIDE 4

SOLUTIONS

COMBINED EXERCISES

COMBINED CONFERENCES

EXCHANGE OF UNITS/PERSONNEL

COMBINED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS/METHODS

LIAISON

SLIDE 5

COOPERATIVE TRAINING BENEFITS

FLEXIBILITY

PREPARATION OF ARMIES FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

ENHANCES RSI

EXCHANGE OF IDEAS

TRUST & CONFIDENCE

UNDERSTANDING

IDENTIFIES DIFFERENCES

SLIDE 6

CONCLUSIONS

MANY GOOD SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS

IMPORTANT TO PREPARE FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ENHANCES ALL ARMIES INVOLVED

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

REPORT OF THE PLANNING AND STEERING COMMITTEES

## REPORT OF THE PLANNING AND STEERING COMMITTEES

1. The Planning Committee, comprised of a delegate from each nation represented, met on 4 and 5 November 1980. The Chairman was Colonel John R. Meese. Areas discussed by the committee included future hosts, locations, dates, themes, and format.

a. The committee recommended that increased time be allocated for panels in future seminars. It was also agreed that, for the sake of continuity, two members from each nation attend PAMS V and that one of these two be scheduled for PAMS VI.

b. The Philippines expressed interest in hosting PAMS V as did Korea. It was suggested that the United States act as co-host at either of the locales accepted by the Steering Committee. It was further recommended that PAMS V convene during the last 3 months of 1981 with precise dates to be determined, after coordination with the selected hosts, by the PAMS Secretariat.

c. Themes recommended for PAMS V were:

- (1) Role of the Military in Nation Building.
- (2) Peacetime Role of the Military.
- (3) Training and Training Management.
- (4) Mutual Trends and Developments.

d. Several sub-topics for each theme were also suggested but it was the committees' collective opinion that the theme should remain broad allowing scheduled attendees to develop their own topics for discussion or presentation.

2. The Steering Committee, comprised of a delegate from each nation represented, met on 6 and 7 November 1980. The Chairman was Colonel Nolan M. Sigler. The committee discussed the findings and recommendations of the Planning Committee concerning PAMS V and policy modifications needed to improve subsequent seminars.

a. The Steering Committee concluded that the theme of PAMS V should be that of "Training Management," and that provisions should be made to accommodate the widest possible range of subjects pertinent to training. The PAMS IV Secretariat was charged with the responsibility for arraying subjects under three broad headings: Policy, Concepts, and Doctrine; Plans and Programs; and Methods and Techniques. When completed, this list will be furnished to all Asian-Pacific armies so that each may select a subject for presentation at PAMS V. Subjects selected will be reported to the PAMS V Secretariat which is charged with reporting to all armies, a composite list of subjects selected. Special subjects of special interest to a particular army may also be accepted for inclusions in PAMS V.

b. The Steering Committee considered the Planning Committee's recommendations on the location and scheduling of PAMS V, and concurred in the following:

(1) The US Army (WESTCOM) should be the permanent co-host of the PAMS series, regardless of the site selected unless such designation is unacceptable to the country in which the seminar is convened.

(2) And in any event the WESTCOM Secretariat should offer administrative and communications support to the other armies designated as co-host or unilateral host.

(3) Manila is the preferred primary site and a time of late 1981 was found generally acceptable for PAMS V, except by the US Army (WESTCOM) which preferred an earlier date (before 1 Oct 81). Seoul was designated alternate site and Honolulu was designated a contingent site with provisions that WESTCOM host if for any reason other armies were unable to host PAMS V. No date was established for contingent hosting by WESTCOM. It was agreed that, since some representatives were unable to make final decisions concerning hosting, the preceding information would be submitted to their respective leaders, and subsequent decisions would be transmitted to the PAMS IV Secretariat. The PAMS V Secretariat is charged with compiling the collected decisions and issuing a report of recommendations received.

c. The Steering Committee agreed that training management discussions should address Active and Reserve Components training.

d. The Steering Committee concurred with the following administrative recommendations submitted by the Planning Committee:

(1) That on each major issue or subject the seminar should follow a sequence of Presentations--Panel Discussions--Panel presentations to plenary sessions.

(2) That the seminar should examine the schedule that would allow each afternoon to be dedicated entirely to panel discussions or workshop on a particular subject.

(3) That there should be a discussion of equipment as it is relevant to the force structure of units affected by the training management discussions.

(4) That if possible, collateral activities such as command post exercise or field training exercise should be scheduled in conjunction with the seminar in order to maintain maximum benefit from travel funds expended.



PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

7 November 1980

CLOSING REMARKS

MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT E. WOLFF  
COMMANDER, US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

## MAJOR GENERAL WOLFF'S PAMS DINNER REMARKS

This evening, we are about to close the books on the Fourth Session of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar. I believe that you have found the subject of Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) both fascinating and compelling: fascinating because of its diversity viewed from everyone's peculiar perspective; compelling because of its timeliness, recognizing that insurgencies are not merely threats to face tomorrow but realities of today.

Our keynote speaker, General Starry, advised us to learn and to share lessons from our encounters with insurgent movements. In doing so, he underscored the heart and the essence of our PAMS Program which is the exchange of information and experiences for our mutual benefit.

In some presentations, we saw how insurgencies can be overcome through purely social and economic processes, as in Singapore or, through a combination of military and political activities as in Thailand and Malaysia.

In the case of Thailand, we also learned that a nation's forces must be prepared to defeat insurgency on two levels at once--internal and external: internal to defend against attempted overthrow of the government; external to defend against the threat which crosses national borders.

You discussed the unique two-function approach to national defense of the Indonesian Armed Forces. They perform the traditional security role while actively participating in nation building. It reminded some of us of General Perera's address at PAMS III concerning the role of the Army in nation building.

The complexities of the socio-religious impetus and antigovernment activities in the Philippines were amplified, clarified, identified, and classified in a lively session by our Philippine delegation and "a self-described civilian in uniform (COL Ocampo)."

The Vanuatu operation by the soldiers from Papua New Guinea was interestingly presented as a case study of success. It demonstrated how a small nation can succeed where large nations are likely to fail.

In a precedent setting presentation, our Japanese observers shared with us some of their unique problems.

Korea showed us that internal defense may be demanded and required, not as a result of internal dissent but due to the serious threat of a next door neighbor who sneakily infiltrates and cunningly destabilizes domestic tranquility.

Our friends from New Zealand examined a counterinsurgency operation in which they participated as part of a multinational peace-keeping force. It was an example which provides a prescription for international cooperation to insure a peaceful change of political power.

To complement all of these valuable presentations, we have attempted to provide the most current US Army thinking on counterinsurgency doctrine and theory. We included techniques of intelligence collection as well as our fundamental philosophy for military interoperability among nations.

Whereas all of these presentations, discussions and the overall theme provided the stimulation for the desired dialogue, many of you have convinced me that the initial presentations concerning the future structure of the US Army and the 9th Infantry Division Test Bed Program may have been considered the most informative and revealing presentations.

I know that it is useless to agree on interoperability without practicing what we advocate. Now as you consider new doctrine, organization, tactics and procedures for your own armies, the overarching thoughts stimulated by our Division 86 presentation will prove valuable.

We have agreed on the desirability to have compatible equipment and arms so we can fight together efficiently. We have agreed that we should be able to fire each other's shells and small arms ammunition so that not each and every one of us is required to stockpile war reserves at prohibitive costs. Without such interoperability, commonality and compatibility, we will not only be doomed to crumble into operational and logistical chaos, but perhaps none of us will be able to sustain a conflict long enough to insure success.

Our professional consensus identified the full advantage which accrues to all of us collectively, and to the smallest countries individually, from the vast industrial might of my country, or Japan, or Korea, if we are wise enough to achieve the equipment compatibility, the ammunition commonality, and the command and control interoperability we talk about so professionally and need so badly for coalition warfare. Our friends from Thailand have the most recent experience with the wisdom of the points I have just made.

Along different lines, the consensus of this group pointed a critical finger at our military planners who are concentrating on methods and techniques to project massive, lethal military power for short conflicts. We seem to have identified that this short war concept does not provide for the sustainability required to counter insurgencies. You pointed out that such a mentality on the part of the large and the powerful makes it impossible for the smaller, less powerful, friend and ally to count or rely on sustaining assistance when needed. You considered a plan which contemplates only an early knockout blow for victory to be unrealistic and unmindful of recent history.

Lastly, you pointed to force structure as being arrayed for a nuclear or conventional linear conflict without providing the small, highly-trained units which you have identified as requisites for some counterinsurgency operations.

Turning to the strategic for a moment, General Vessey, the Vice Chief of Staff of our Army, in his presentation highlighted the importance of the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. He reminded us that the United States is a Pacific power with vital and historic interests in the region. With that as a backdrop, and the probability of destabilizing terrorist or insurgent movements, a rethinking of a short war power projection policy is needed. You also asked us to structure our military forces so that we retain the capability to assist in internal defense operations when our common interests are threatened.

Our final guest speaker gave us both reminder and challenge. General Poananga reminded us that PAMS has great value from which to benefit. He reminded us that the participants represent professionalism at the highest level; thus, there is an opportunity for all of us to benefit. He reminded us that the force of arms cannot make up for what a government fails to do. He reminded us that wars require the long-haul approach to bring them to a satisfactory completion. Among the several challenges, the least controversial I believe, was that which asks us to stay involved, to stay in tune with and in step with our governments rather than live the isolated life of a snake-eating, jungle-busting, combat soldier.

We took particular note of General Poananga's observation that a government which cannot be sustained through the ballot box is, in fact, not worth sustaining.

When I try to synthesize the thoughts of wisdom and meaningful substance which resulted from our seminar, I find it impossible to do justice because you have accomplished so much during this week. I would, therefore, like to strike out on my own summary and say that we have proven beyond any reasonable doubt that a heterogeneous group such as ours does not need to become a homogeneous mass where everything is the same, alike, or similar -- one glob without individuality or difference. There is only need for each of us individually, and all of us collectively, to be motivated by the same lofty goals. Ours are freedom, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which we consider worth fighting and dying for. I did not ask what yours were at the outset, but I am convinced that we have the same lofty goals and the armies we represent are seeking interoperability to aid one another.

Once again, we had a successful session of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar thanks to the participants. I thank you and I congratulate you for your contributions.

Remember our motto at PAMS: "Every Conversation is an Education."

LIST OF PRESENTATIONS\*

- "Division 86"  
LTC Beltson and LTC Zimmerman, US Army
- "9th Infantry Division Test Bed Program"  
MG Stone and MAJ Jones, US Army
- "Introduction to Internal Defense and Development"  
LTC DeBauche, US Army
- "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines"  
COL Oropesa, Philippine Army
- "Internal Defense of a Nation"  
LTC Charn, Thailand
- "Internal Defense and Development Intelligence Operations"  
MAJ Meikle, US Army
- "Management and the Role of the Army in Internal Defense and Development"  
COL Adam Saleh, Indonesia
- "Counterinfiltration Training and Coastal Security"  
COL Nam, Republic of Korea
- "The Development of Internal Defense"  
LTC Ng, Singapore
- "Internal Defense and Development: Doctrine and Concept"  
MAJ Hyrowski, US Army
- "Interoperability and Commonality"  
COL Wagg, US Army
- "The Vanuatu Operation"  
COL Huai, Papua New Guinea
- "ADP in Support of Internal Defense"  
COL Rhoads, US Army
- "The Military as a Modernizing Force"  
LTC DeBauche, US Army
- "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia"  
LTC Moloney, New Zealand

\*Note: These presentations are not included in this text due to their length. Copies of these presentations will be provided, however, in the PAMS addendum.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - IV

3-7 November 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SECRETARIAT

COL Nolan M. SIGLER, USA, Seminar Chairman

MAJ Sterling R. RICHARDSON, USA, Agenda/Program Coordinator

MAJ Lawrence H. TIFVERMAN, USA, Administration/Support Coordinator

SFC Billy S. RAUS, NCOIC

SSG Robert L. CREIGHTON, NCOIC

SP5 William V. HOLLOWAY, Administrative Assistant

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Ms. Patricia KAUFELDT, Recording Secretary

Ms. Becky D. GUSTAFSON, Recording Secretary

Ms. Gloria SAMALA, Recording Secretary

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Ms. Linda IGNACIO, Recording Secretary

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